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Virginia3" has a harsh law for defaulting counties. It allows the Gov-
ernor, upon petition by the bondholders, to order the state comp-
troller to withhold payments to the county of state funds (except school
funds) until the default is overcome.
Montana31 provides for refunding if the refunding plan is approved
by the state examiner.
The default problem in North Carolina3 2 has been handled through
the Local Government Commission which advises and aids local units
in drafting refunding plans.
If neither Federal nor State action alone can solve this problem
adequately, it has been suggested that a desirable result might be reached
by making their legislation complementary. Through the "full faith
and credit" clause "Congress might exercise its bankruptcy power by an
act which would recognize the validity of state adjudications and state
discharges wherever the jurisdiction of Congress extends."33
All of the above legislation has been an attempt to remedy the evil
after it has come into existence. The state legislatures should prevent
the formation of this evil in the future by enacting strict measures
which would prevent local governmental units from burdening them-
selves during "boom" periods with excessive and unnecessary bonded
indebtedness. W. C. HOLT.
Constitutional Law-Minimum Wage Legislation.
The United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision1 recently de-
clared unconstitutional a New York minimum wage statute2 for women.
The Court based its conclusion entirely upon the case of Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital,3 which banned an attempt of Congress to regulate wages
for women in the District of Columbia as an "unconstitutional inter-
ference with the freedom of contract included within the guaranties of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
IVA. LAWS (1932) c. 148.
MoNT. LAws (EXTRA SEssioN 1933) c. 6.
In North Carolina over 250 local units have defaulted in the last siZ years.
(1936). 25 NAT. MUN. REv. 323. There are at present 24 counties and 98 cities and
towns in default, 3 Pop. GOV'T 16 (1936).
(1935) 22 VA. LAW REv. 39; (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 702 (discussing comity by
the Federal Courts to state statutory receiverships of defaulting municipalities).
'Morehead v. People of New York, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed. Adv. op. 921
(1936).
2 N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill's, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) c. 32, §§550-567. Statute
set up a wage board to conduct investigations concerning wage payment and to
determine minimum wages in certain industries upon proof that the employee
was being paid an "oppressive wage." An oppressive wage was defined as one
"less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than
sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health." Violation
of this act was punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both.2261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1922).
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The condemning feature of the District of Columbia statute was
that it required the employer to pay a sum sufficient to supply "the nec-
essary cost of living" to the woman employee, thus exacting from him,
in the words of the Court, "an arbitrary payment for a purpose and
upon a basis having no causal connection with his business." 4 The ma-
jority stated that the statute looked at only the side of the employee and
failed to consider the equal rights of the employer, thus leaving the im-
pression that an act which would take into consideration the rights of
both parties to the employment contract might be valid.
In addition to the standard used in the District of Columbia statute,
and for the protection of the employer, the New York law added an-
other requirement to its "living wage"; namely, that the amount paid
be "reasonably commensurate with the services rendered." 5 A minimum
wage, to be fair, must weigh the equities and needs of both employer
and employee, as the New York Legislature undoubtedly intended should
be done. Yet, the majority in the present case failed to see any sound
distinction in the two acts on this point and argued that the acts differed
merely in "details, methods, and time."
"There is grim irony," the minority believe, "in speaking of the free-
dom of contract of those who, because of their economic necessities,
give their services for less than is needful to keep body and soul to-
gether."0
This freedom of contract that the Court believed so essential
to personal liberty is not without restraint: businesses charged with a
public interest may be regulated;t the character, method and time for
payment of wages may be governed;8 hours of labor may be fixed ;9
and even wages may be set to meet and tide over a temporary economic
IId. at 558, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 at 401, 67 L. ed. 785 at 796.
rN. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill's Cum. Supp. 1931-35) c. 32, §551(8).
'Morehead v. People of New York, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 932, 80 L. ed. Adv. Op.
921, 937 (1936).
' Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1877) (Congress may regulate
storage charges in grain elevators) ; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct.
124, 48 L. ed. 148 (1903) (regulating hours of labor for employees of municipal
corporation) ; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755. (1916)
(regulating wages and hours of interstate railroad employees); Block v. Hirsh,
256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1920) (letting of houses in the Dis-
trict of Columbia may become of such a public interest as to authorize legislative
interference).
8 McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. ed. 315 (1908).
(In those mines where it was customary to pay workers according to a specified
rate -per ton of raw coal, statute required coal to be weighed before screening).
'Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780 (1898) (state
regulation of hours the coal miner worked underground) ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L. ed. 830 (1916) (limitation on number of hours
that employees worked in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment in the
state) ; see Note (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 156.
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exigency.10 The Court in the Adkins case, however, was unable to put
the Act of Congress within the purview of these exceptions. It was not
applicable solely to, businesses of a public nature, nor was it made a
temporary measure; rather, it established a permanent policy for the
District of Columbia. It made no effort to govern the character, method,
or periods of wage payments, nor to prescribe hours or conditions under
which labor was to be done. By holding the New York Act irdistinguish-
able from the one considered in the Adkins case, the majority precluded
any argument that this statute might be within these well defined excep-
tions.
Minimum wage legislation is by no means new. 11  Massa-
chusetts was the pioneer in this field, enacting laws for the control
of wages as early as 1912.12 The problem was first presented to the
United States Supreme Court in 1914 when an Oregon statute was held
constitutional by a 4-4 vote in Stettler v. O'Hara.13 Two years later,
an act of Congress establishing a temporary minimum wage schedule
applicable only to interstate railroads was pronounced to be within
constitutional limitations as an emergency measure. 14 With this rather
meager precedent, the Adkins case denied the authority of Congress to
enact general minimum wage legislation.' 5
Notwithstanding the Adkins case, and regarding as doubtful the ef-
fect it might have upon subsequent legislation, several states due to
changed economic conditions have enacted legislation for wage regula-
tion of women workers.' 6 The state courts have not found it difficult
to uphold these statutes as a vaild exercise of the police power for the
protection of the health and morals of the woman worker and for the
" Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1916) (act passed
to counteract a temporary interruption of interstate commerce due to a railroad
labor dispute).
'The first English statutes passed for wage regulation were the ORDINANCE
of LABoRERs in 1349 and the STATUTE OF LABo 0s in 1351, requiring all persons
of certain classes to work, and carefully fixing the most minute details of the
wage contract. In effect, these two statutes fixed maximumn wages rather than
minimum.
= MASS. AcTs AND RESOLVES (1912) c. 706.
243 U. S. 629, 37 Sup. Ct. 475, 61 L. ed. 937. Although the case was argued
in Dec. 1914, the decision was not handed down until April, 1917.
x' Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1916).
In 1923, the Court, in a memorandum decision, felt itself bound by the
Adkins case, and declared unconstitutional an Arizona statute which was sub-
stantially like the District of Columbia statute. Murphy v. Sardle, 269 U. S. 530,
46 Sup. Ct. 22, 70 L. ed. 396 (1923).
" CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) §3613; CoLo. ComP. LAWS (1921)
§§4263-4283; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 48, §§238-256 (by express provision,
in force only until July 1, 1935) ; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§4210-4232; N. H.
Pun. LAWS (1933) c. 87; N. J. LAws (1933) c. 152; N. Y. CoNS. LAWs (Cahill
Cum. Supp. 1931-35) c. 32, §§550-567; OHio LAWS (1933) p. 502; ORE. CODE ANN.
(1930) §§49-301-49-319; S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) §§10022-A-10022-E; UTAH
LAWS (1933) c. 39; WASH. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Rev. 1932) §§7630-7641.
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future well-being of the entire race.' 7 In an important Washington
case, which shows the attitude adopted by these tribunals, the court
justified its decision -by saying that the Adkins case is not conclusive as
to the validity of a state law "enacted in the exercise of the police power
of the state."' 8
It is not inconceivable that the Court could have found substantial
difference in the District of Columbia statute and the New York wage
law to justify a distinction between the two. Nor is it at all unlikely
that the Court might have reached an opposite result had it considered
the constitutional question involved from the broader aspects of present-
day social policy. However, as a practical question, would it be advisable
to regulate the wages of women workers when no such regulation is
placed on men? If so, many industries might discharge their women
employees and replace them with men willing to work for less than the
state has set for women. Furthermore, a minimum wage might be-
come a maximum wage. Lastly, was the Court, in passing on the valid-
ity of the New York Wage Law, defining a fundamental right of in-
dividuals to bargain for the amount of wages to be paid and received,
subject to regulation by neither federal nor state government?
0. W. CLAYTON, JR.
Criminal Law-Double jeopardy.
A and B while together, were held up and robbed by the defend-
ants. A was killed. The defendants were tried and found innocent of the
murder of A. Subsequently, they were indicted for robbery with fire-
arms of B to which they pleaded not guilty and former jeopardy. The
plea of former jeopardy was overruled; the North Carolina Supreme
Court held the tvo crimes separate and distinct, as there was no identity
of offenses.'
It is a fundamental principle that a person cannot be tried twice for
the same offense, and a plea of former acquittal or conviction will be
sustained, 2 if the defendant could have been convicted under the first
1'Holcombe v. Creamer, 213 Mass. 99, 120 N. E. 354 (1918); Wil-
liams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495 (1917); Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Ore.
261, 141 Pac. 158 (1914) ; Malette v. City of Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496
(1913) ; Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918). Contrc Topeka
Laundry Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 119 Kan. 12, 237 Pac. 1041 (1925) ;
see Stevenson v. St. Clair, 161 Minn. 444, 201 N. W. 629 (1925) (statute constitu-
tional as to minors).
"West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 55 P. (2d) 1083, 1089 (Wash. 1936).
Probable jurisdiction of the case is noted in 57 Sup. Ct. 40. If certiorari is granted,
this case is expeoted to decide more definitely the constitutionality of minimum
wage legislation, and clear up the doubts left by the -principal case.
'State v. Dills and Osborne, 210 N. C. 178, 185 S. E. 677 (1936).
'See State v. Mansfield, 207 N. C. 233, 236, 176 S. E. 761, 762 (1934) ; N. C.
CoNsT., art. 1, §17; U. S. CowsT., Amm,. V.
